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I. INTRODUCTION
Middleton v. N. W Airlines' marked the first time the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that suicide caused solely by work-related
stress was a compensable workers' compensation injury.2 The court
reached its landmark decision after granting certiorari review of
the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeal's (WCCA) decision to
affirm denial of benefits.' This decision broke from Minnesota's
long tradition of denying claims for work-related mental injuries
absent a precipitating or resulting physical injury.4 At the same
time, the Middleton holding placed Minnesota more squarely in line
with other states that compensate mental injuries without the pres-
ence of physical injuries. 5 In addition, the court's decision was re-
1. 600 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1999).
2. Id.at710-11.
3. Id. at 707-708. The compensation judge denied the relator's claim on
grounds that she had not shown Middleton's job stress was the legal causation of
his suicide. Id. at 708. Legal causation is found when the stress of employment is
shown to be beyond the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all employees are ex-
posed. Id. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals ("WCCA") affirmed
without reaching the issue of legal causation. Id. at 709. The WCCA based its de-
cision on Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1981)
(finding the claim was properly denied because the suicide was the result of a non-
compensable mental injury).
4. Johnson v. Paul's Auto and Truck Sales, 409 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn.
1987) (holding mental stress noncompensable because employee had no physical
ailment susceptible of discrete medical treatment); Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 927
(holding manic depressive disorder brought on by job stress to be noncom-
pensable absent clear legislative intent to compensate mental disabilities without
physical trauma); Jaakola v. Olympic Steel, Inc. 56 W.C.D. 238, 240 (Minn. Work.
Comp. Ct. App. 1996), affd, 560 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1997) (unpublished opinion)
(holding stress noncompensable because employee had not received medical
treatment for a physical injury and because the legislature did not intend to make
mental injuries compensable); Larson v. McNamara Contracting, 48 W.C.D. 105,
111 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 495 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1993) (un-
published opinion) (holding post-traumatic stress disorder noncompensable be-
cause it was not triggered by physical injury).
5. George W. Jackson Mental Health Ctr. v. Lambie, 898 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the benefits award was proper because there
was no independent intervening cause which broke the chain of causation be-
tween the work-related stress and the suicide); Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co.,
526 N.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Iowa 1995) (holding depression and stress compensable
1308 [Vol. 27:2
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flective of policies that provide the foundation for worker's com-
6
pensation insurance.
II. HISTORY OF MINNESOTA LAW
A. The Statute
Minnesota's Workers' Compensation statute holds employers
"liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or
death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employ-•. ,,8
ment' without regard to the question of negligence. With this
language, the statute pre-empts tort remedies and defenses.
The workers' compensation system in Minnesota is based on a
mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by em-
ployers and employees alike. Employees' rights to sue for damages
over and above medical and health care benefits and wage loss
if factual and legal causation is shown); Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 410 S.E.2d 248,
250 (S.C. 1991) (holding nervous breakdown compensable when triggered by an
increased workload that constituted an unusual and extraordinary condition of
employment); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Workmens' Comp. Appeal Bd., 405 A.2d
1048, 1050-51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding compensable a suicide that was
induced by a work-related mental breakdown which, according to the medical tes-
timony, was the result of overwork and anxiety); But see Sorensen v. City of Omaha,
430 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Neb. 1988) (holding stress-induced gastritis noncom-
pensable because employee did not meet burden of showing violence to the physi-
cal structure of the body); Wolf v. Northmont City Schs., 528 N.E.2d 589, 590-91
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from har-
assment by school principal to be noncompensable because there was no physical
injury); Lather v. Huron Coll., 413 N.W.2d 369, 372 (S.D. 1987) (holding no legis-
lative intent to compensate for attempted suicide brought about by work-related
stress).
6. Amy S. Berry, Comment: The Reality Of Work-Related Stress: An Analysis Of
How Mental Disability Claims Should Be Handled Under The North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act, 20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 321, 324 (1988). "State legislatures enacted
workers' compensation statutes to assure income to workers who suffered dis-
abling injuries on the job, to provide treatment and rehabilitation for work-related
injuries, and to facilitate a return to work." Id.
7. Id. at 326 (quoting Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress
Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 882
(1987)):
An injury arises out of employment if it is the result of a risk to which the
employee was exposed because of the nature, conditions, obligations, or
incidents of the employment. The course of employment requirement
examines the time, place, and circumstances of the injury in relation to
the employment.
Id.
8. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1)(2000).
130920001
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benefits are to a certain degree limited by [the statutory provi-
sions], and employers' rights to common law defenses.. .are cur-
tailed as well. 9
The statute further provides that intentionally self-inflicted in-
juries are not compensable. 0 On the topic of self-inflicted injuries
that culminate in suicide, the legislature has been somewhat am-
bivalent over the years. Prior to 1967, the statute required employ-
ers to compensate injuries "unless the injury or death was intention-
ally self-inflicted."" In 1967, the aforementioned language was
buttressed with an express exclusion of compensation for suicide."
The pendulum swung back in 1973 when the legislature deleted
the express exclusion of suicide as well as the term "death." Since
1973 the relevant language has been as follows: "If the injury was in-
tentionally self-inflicted... then the employer is not liable.'
3
B. Case Law
1. Mental Injuries Not Culminating In Suicide
On numerous occasions, Minnesota courts have examined the
compensability of work-related mental injuries under the statute. 
4
9. Craig B. Nichols, Article, Work-Related Mental Injuries: Minnesota's Compen-
sability Standards, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 259, 259-60 (1998).
10. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1)(1999). "If the injury was intentionally self-
inflicted or the intoxication of the employee is the proximate cause of the injury,
then the employer is not liable for compensation. The burden of proof of these
facts is upon the employer." Id.
11. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1)(1965) (emphasis added).
12. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1)(1971). "Every such employer is liable for com-
pensation... unless the injury or death was intentionally self-inflicted.. .suicides are
not compensable." Id.
13. MINN. STAT. § 176.021 (1) (1999) (emphasis added).
14. Childers v. Honeywell, Inc., 505 N.W.2d 611, 612 (Minn. 1993);Johnson
v. Paul's Auto & Truck Sales, Inc., 409 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn.1987); Rindahl v.
Brighton Wood Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn. 1986); Meils v. N.W. Bell
Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 1984); Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344
N.W.2d 597, 605 (Minn. 1984); Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d
924, 926 (Minn.1981); Mitchell v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 290 N.W.2d 753, 756
(Minn. 1980); Aker v. State of Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 282 N.W.2d 533, 536
(Minn. 1979); Schwartz v. Talmo, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1973); Lehman v.
A.V. Winterer Co., 136 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. 1965); Olson v. F.I. Crane Lumber
Co., 107 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. 1961); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 101 N.W.2d
435, 441 (Minn. 1960); Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 67 N.W.2d 656, 670
(Minn. 1954); Welchlin v. Fairmont Ry. Motors, 230 N.W. 897, 902 (Minn. 1930);
Jaakola v. Olympic Steel, Inc., 56 W.C.D. 238, 240 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App.
1996); Larson v. McNamara Contracting, 48 W.C.D. 105, 111 (Minn. Work. Comp.
1310 [Vol. 27:2
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Earlier decisions provided compensation only if a physical injury
also occurred, 15 such that only cases of so-called physical/mental
injuries or mental/physical injuries 6 were compensable. While
holding firm to the requirement of either a precipitating or result-
ing physical injury, Minnesota has compensated mental injuries
that resulted from minor physical injuries. Mitchell v. White Castle
Systems, Inc.'s held as compensable depression arising in an em-
ployee whose face was slapped at work. Further, Ziebarth v. Hubbard
Milling Co.19 awarded compensation for depression resulting from a
work-related incident in which the employee sustained a bruised
hip.
a. Precipitating Physical Injuries
Courts have compensated parties when the mental injury was
caused by a work-related physical injury. As early as 1930 in. . 20
Welchlin v. Fairmont Railway Motors, the supreme court granted
partial disability payments to a worker who suffered a "neurosis"
precipitated by an injury to his leg and groin. The court based its
holding on English case law, 2' and reasoned the neurosis continued
22
the disability brought about by the original physical injury. Min-
nesota courts have continued to apply this reasoning in subsequent
Ct. App. 1992); Casler v. RCI Brokerage, Inc., No. 474-42-6794, 1995 WL 376768,
at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 8, 1995); Dunn v. U.S. West Communica-
tions, 52 W.C.D. 682, 682 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1995); Schanil v. Com-
munications Sys., Inc., 51 W.C.D. 251, 256 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1994);
Pettis v. United Parcel Serv., No. 574-10-1311, 1990 WL 166134, at *2 (Minn.
Work. Comp. Ct. App. April 26, 1990); Ziebarth v. Hubbard Milling, 1989 WL
226720, at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1989); Bruels v. Cloutier & Musech,
No. 469-46-1258, 1989 WL 226710, at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. September
11, 1989).
15. Nichols, supra note 9, at 278. "Mental claims resulting in solely mental
stimulus.. .are, pursuant to Lockwood, not compensable." Id.
16. 3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAWS, § 56.01 (1999) (describing three types of mental injury claims: 1. Physi-
cal/mental: mental injury produced by physical stimulus; 2. Mental/physical:
physical injury produced by mental stimulus; 3. Mental/mental: mental injury
produced by mental stimulus).
17. But see Dunn, 52 W.C.D at 682 (declining to compensate post-traumatic
stress disorder caused by robbery in which plaintiff sustained a minor wrist injury
on grounds injury was an insufficient physical trauma).
18. 290 N.W.2d at 756.
19. 1989 WL 226720, at *3.
20. 230 N.W. 897, 898 (Minn. 1930).
21. Eaves v. Blaenclydah Colliery Co., [1909] 2 KB. 73 (Eng.).
22. Welchlin, 230 N.W. at 898.
20001 1311
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cases and have declined compensation only when causation was not
found."
b. Resulting Physical Injuries
Compensation has also been awarded when a work-related
mental injury resulted in a physical injury. In Aker v. State Depart-
24ment of Natural Resources, the supreme court granted compensation
to the widow of an employee who experienced a mild heart attack
one day after recovering decomposed bodies from a campsite and
suffered a second, fatal heart attack two weeks later. The court rea-
soned the removal of the bodies subjected the employee to ex-
treme emotional stress and proximately caused physical injury and
death2 5
In Bruels v. Cloutier & Musech,26 the only subsequent case of this
nature, the court awarded compensation to an office manager who
suffered temporal mandibularjoint syndrome (TMJ) and recurrent
27rectal bleeding as a result of job stress. Bruels expanded Aker in
that the Bruels court recognized physical injuries resulting from
28cumulative stress, whereas Aker's injury resulted from a specific
incident. In addition, Bruels recognized that for a stress-induced
physical injury to be compensable, the precipitating stress must be
beyond the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all employees are
29exposed .
c. No Physical Injuries
Compensation has not been awarded when mental injuries oc-
curred absent physical injuries. The landmark case, Lockwood v. In-
23. Ringdahl v. Brighton Wood Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.
1986); Mitchell, 290 N.W.2d at 756; Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 67
N.W.2d 656, 660; Dunn v. US West Communications, 52 W.C.D. 682, 684-85
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1995); Ziebarth, 1989 WL 226720, at *3 (awarding
compensation in all save Dunn and Ringdahl).
24. 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979).
25. Id. at 536.
26. No. 469-46-1258, 1989 WL 226710, at *1 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App.
1989).
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at*1.
29. Id. at *2. But see Meils v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn.
1984) (granting compensation for suicide caused by stress without regard to
whether that stress was beyond the ordinary stress of employment).
1312 [Vol. 27:2
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dependent School District No. 877,s° denied compensation to a high
school principal who experienced stress as a result of a rapidly
growing school district. While the court acknowledged that Lock-
wood could be seen as a natural extension of Hartman v. Cold Spring
Granite Co.31 and Aker,12 it declined compensation because there was
no clear legislative intent to compensate mental disabilities without
physical trauma."
Cases subsequent to Lockwood yielded the same result with
analyses that were variations on the Lockwood theme. The courts
denied compensation because stress-induced physical ailments
were not susceptible to discrete medical treatment, because stress-
induced symptoms were alleviated when stress disappeared,35 or be-
36cause the employee simply had not sustain6d a physical injury.
2. Mental Injuries Culminating In Suicide
On five prior occasions, Minnesota has addressed workers'
compensation claims where mental injuries culminated in suicide.3 v
The cases differed from Middleton in that each involved a precipitat-
38ing physical injury. While holding firm to requiring precipitating
physical injury, courts allowed the suicide to be remote in time
30. 312 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1981).
31. 67 N.W.2d 656, 663 (Minn. 1954) (awarding compensation to employee
who suffered depression subsequent to three work-related injuries over eighteen
months).
32. Aker v. State of Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 282 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn.
1979); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926.
34. Johnson v. Paul's Auto & Truck Sales Inc., 409 N.W.2d 506, 508-09 (Minn.
1987); Pettis v. United Parcel Ser., No. 469-44-2350, 1990 WL 166134, at *2-3
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. April 26, 1990).
35. Schanil v Communications Sys., Inc., 51 W.C.D. 251, 258 (Minn. Work.
Comp. Ct. App. 1994).
36. Jaakola v. Olympic Steel, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 92, 92 (Minn. 1997); Larson v
McNamara Contracting, 495 N.W.2d 207, 208 (Minn. 1993).
37. Ziebarth v. Hubbard Milling Co., No. 574-10-1311, 1989 WL 226720, at *1
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. September 15, 1989) (compensating depression
triggering an attempted suicide).
38. But see Anderson v. Armour & Co., 101 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. 1960)
(treating as a physical injury an automobile accident in which a pedestrian was in-
jured but the employee was not). Cf Casler v. RCI Brokerage, Inc., No. 474-42-
6794, 1995 WL 376768, at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 8, 1995) (deny-
ing compensation for second automobile accident in which employee was not
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from the physical injury.3 9 The courts awarded compensation in
three of the five cases, with statutory revisions as well as a changing
view of legal causation playing roles in the outcomes.
a. Compensable Suicide
Beginning in 1960 with Anderson v. Armour & Co.4 0, the court
applied the Sponatskt 1 causation rule. To award compensation un-
der the Sponatski rule, a court must find the decedent acted "with-
out conscious volition to produce his or her death and without
knowledge of the physical consequences of his or her act"42 and
must deem a "direct and unbroken causal connection between the
injury and the suicide., 4' The Anderson court mirrored Sponatski
and held a suicide to be compensable when the employee "killed
himself while possessed of an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse
or while in a delirium of frenzy without rational knowledge of the
physical consequences of his act.",44 Sponatski held the chain of cau-
sation between the work-related injury and subsequent suicide was
unbroken provided the decedent did not "know the purpose and
the physical effect of the suicidal act.
The same year, and still in keeping with Sponatski, the court
awarded compensation for suicide precipitated by a work-induced46
heart attack in Olson v. E.L Crane Lumber Co. The Court based its
39. Meils v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 1984) (holding as
compensable suicide nine years after back injury that was a substantial contribut-
ing cause of the suicide). But see Lehman v. A.V. Winterer Co., 136 N.W.2d 649,
651 (Minn. 1965) (holding as "too remote and speculative" a suicide preceded by
three and one-half years by a work-related back injury).
40. 101 N.W.2d at 440 (involving an employee whose psychotic depression
was precipitated by an automobile accident which injured a pedestrian but did not
injure the employee).
41. In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466, 468 (Mass. 1915):
[W] here there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an
insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own
life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of
frenzy without conscious volition to produce death, having
knowledge of the physical consequences of the act, then there is
a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical
injury and the death.
42. LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 9 COUCH ON INS. § 136:51, 2 (3d ed.
1999).
43. Id. (quoting Lehman, 136 N.W.2d at 649).
44. Anderson, 101 N.W.2d at 440.
45. Sponatski, 108 N.E. at 468.
46. 107 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. 1961) (involving an employee who devel-
1314 [Vol. 27:2
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holding on Anderson 7 and reasoned by analogy to find Olson's
heart attack more psychologically taxing than Anderson's traffic
collision. "It would seem that a severe coronary attack could prey
on a victim's mind, causing mental illness, even more so than a
highway accident."48
Over twenty years later, Meils v. N. W. Bell Tel. Co.49 awarded
compensation for a suicide that occurred nine years after a back in-
jury. The court was able to do so because of the 1973 statutory re-
vision" and due to rejection of the Sponatski rule. The court in-
stead adopted the objective causation test, which "simply requires
the [plaintiff] to establish a causal connection between the work-
place and the mental injury; she need not establish that the stress
that caused the injury was unusual or extraordinary."52 The court
articulated the new rule for Minnesota as follows:
The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish by substan-
tial evidence that the employee's work-related injury and its conse-
quences directly caused a mental derangement of such severity that
it overrode normal, rational thinking and judgment. The claimant
must prove by substantial evidence an unbroken chain of causation
between the work-related injury, the mental derangement, and the
suicide. As in other subsequent injury situations, the work-related
injury need not be the sole cause of the suicide, but it must be a
53substantial cause.
In the twenty-four years that elapsed between Anderson and
Meils, Minnesota's Supreme Court and legislature made dramatic
alterations that poised the court for Middleton. The legislature's
statutory amendments reopened the door for compensation of sui-
cides brought on by work-related injuries. Meanwhile, the court
abandoned the "delirium of frenzy" standard of Anderson that had
been derived from Sponatski.5 The court abandoned "Sponatski's
insistence that the employee realize neither the purpose nor the
oped depression and committed suicide after sustaining a heart attack while
unloading lumber).
47. Anderson, 101 N.W.2d at 441.
48. Olson, 107 N.W.2d at 225.
49. 355 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1984).
50. Id. at 715.
51. Id. at 714; see also MINN. STAT. § 176.021 (1)(1999).
52. Glenn M. Troost, Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress in the
Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 848 (1985).
53. MeiIs, 355 N.W.2d at 715.
54. Anderson v. Armour & Co., 101 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 1960).
2000] 1315
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physical effect of the suicidal act., 55 Instead the court moved Min-
nesota to a legal stance where "[t] he employee's realization of the
purpose and physical consequences of his act are irrelevant to the
question of causation.
b. Non-Compensable Suicide
In the more than two decades that elapsed between Olson and
Meils, Minnesota denied compensation for suicide in two cases, cit-
ing different reasons in each. Applying the Sponatski rule, the court
heard Lehman v. A. V Winterer Co.5 in 1965, but declined to award
compensation because the employee's suicide came three and one-
half years after his physical injury.
The general rule that where insanity and suicide follow an
injury to a workman which was otherwise compensable
compensation may be awarded if the act of suicide re-
sulted from an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of
frenzy and without conscious volition to cause death does
not apply in the absence of a direct and unbroken causal
connection between the injury and the suicide and where
the record indicates that other factors constituted an in-
tervening cause.59
The court again denied compensation in Schwartz v. Talmo"
where the employee's suicide followed one and one-half years after
a back injury and resulting depression. 61 Despite the time lapse,
the court found a causal connection between the injury and the
suicide,r2 but denied compensation due to the 1967 statutory
63
amendment expressly excluding suicide.
55. Meils, 355 N.W.2d at 714.
56. Id.
57. 136 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1965) (involving an employee who committed
suicide after sustaining depression precipitated by a back injury caused by unload-
ing pipe).
58. Id. at 651 (reasoning that a "[b] rain derangement which resulted in [de-
cedent's] death was not causally connected with his physical injury. The possibility
that [decedent's] suicide resulted from a state of depression or despondency
caused by the work-related injury is too remote and speculative to support an
award.").
59. Id. at 649.
60. 205 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1973).
61. Id. at 322.
62. Id. at 320.
63. Id. at 322 ("The language of the statute is clear and explicit and makes
suicides which occur after September 1, 1967, noncompensable."); see also supra
1316 [Vol. 27:2
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Minnesota's statute and causation standards have evolved over
the years. Middleton presented the first opportunity to apply those
changes to a suicide absent a physical injury.
III. HISTORY OF THE LAW IN OTHERJURISDICTIONS
An examination of case law in other jurisdictions reveals some
states are in line with Minnesota's precedent of awarding com pen-
sation only for physical/mental or mental/physical injuries.-- At
the same time, other states were ahead of Minnesota in awarding
61compensation for purely mental/mental injuries.
As was the case in Minnesota prior to Middleton, other states
have various reasons for denying compensation for mental disor-
ders absent a physical injury. Some states hold firm to the principle
that the only compensable injuries are physical injuries.6 At least
one state, citing Lockwood, relied upon a lack of legislative intent to
compensate absent a physical injury.67
In cases where mental injuries culminated in suicide, states
have employed varying causation standards when examining the
linkage between employment, mental illness and suicide. Missouri
has applied the Sponatski rule68 to deny compensation where the
decedent was found to have knowingly and willfully committed sui-
cide.69 At the same time, other states have applied the objective
note 12 and accompanying text.
64. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
65. Id.
66. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 298 (Neb. 1988) (denying
compensation due to a lack of "violence to the physical structure of the body...");
Dockum v. Syroco Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (N.Y. 1999) (denying compensation
for attempted suicide following job termination on the grounds that purely mental
injuries are not compensable); Wolf v. Northmont City Schs., 38 Ohio App. 3d
118, 118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (denying compensation for post-traumatic stress
disorder following on-thejob harassment because there was no physical injury);
Pinkerton v. State, ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 939 P.2d 250, 251
(Wyo. 1997) (denying compensation for mental illness arising from correction of-
ficer's discovery of inmate's body on grounds mental injury absent a physical in-
jury is not compensable).
67. Lather v. Huron Coll., 413 N.W.2d 369, 372 (S.D. 1987) (citing Lockwood's
reasoning of lack of legislative intent to deny compensation for attempted suicide
by college basketball coach).
68. Supra note 41, at 468 and accompanying text.
69. Rooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (holding as non-compensable a suicide committed with "sufficient mental
power to know the purpose and effect of the act."); Kolde by Kolde v. St. Louis
County, 809 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding as non-compensable a
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causal connection test in their analyses. ° Provided factual causa-
tion 71 is shown, the objective causal connection test holds the em-
ployer liable if "(e)mployment conditions, when compared to non-
employment conditions, were the major contributing cause of the
mental disorder.,
72
In George W. Jackson Mental Health Ctr. v. Lambie,73 Arkansas ap-
plied the objective causal connection standard to award compensa-
tion for a computer programmer's suicide that resulted from the
stress of implementing an unworkable computer program. The
court found there was no "independent intervening cause breaking
the chain of causation between the stress [the programmer] ex-
perienced as a result of his employment and his suicide.
74
Iowa dropped the Sponatski-like standard it first articulated in
195975 and adopted the objective causal standard with its holding in
Kostelac v. Feldman's, Inc.76 In two recent cases, Iowa courts further
refined their objective standard by emphasizing
[c]ausation exists if [an employee's] stresses and tensions,
when viewed objectively and not as the employee per-
ceives them, were of greater magnitude than the day-to-
day mental stresses workers employed in the same or simi-
lar jobs experience routinely regardless of em-
ployer... Evidence of the stresses of other workers em-
suicide that was not committed while "insane") (superceded by statute); but cf
Anderson v. Noel T. Adams Ambulance Dist., 931 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) (employing the objective causal connection standard and holding as com-
pensable post-traumatic stress disorder not resulting in suicide); Todd v. Goostree,
493 S.W.2d 411, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding as compensable a "traumatic
neurosis" which arose after employee accidentally crushed co-worker to death).
70. Infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
71. Humboldt Cmty. Schs. v. Fleming, 603 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Iowa 1999)
("The claimant must show the job caused the mental injury (the factual causation)
and that the mental injury was caused by stress of a greater magnitude than the
day-to-day stress experienced by workers in the same or similar jobs (legal causa-
tion).").
72. Troost, supra note 52, at 852.
73. 898 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995).
74. Id.; see also Owens v. Nat'l Health Labs., Inc., 648 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1983) (denying compensation for mental illness not culminating in sui-
cide on grounds it resulted neither from a traumatic episode nor from cumulative
stress in excess of the ordinary day-to-day stress experienced by all employees).
75. Schofield v. White, 95 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Iowa 1959) (articulating a "delir-
ium of frenzy" rule).
76. 497 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Iowa 1993) (overruling "delirium of frenzy" rule
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ployed by the same employer in the "same or similar jobs
will usually be most persuasive and determinative on the
issue .7
In addition, outside the Eighth Circuit, at least six other states
have applied the objective causal connection test to cases in which
mental injuries culminated in suicide.7 s It is within this historical
and existing context that Middleton v. N. W. Airlines reached Minne-
sota's Supreme Court.
IV. THE FACTS OF MIDDLETON
James Middleton, a long-term employee of N.W. Airlines, 79
held a position in the tubing department and performed duties
that required attention to detail and precision. Beginning in
1993, Middleton experienced work-related stress as a result of
changes that occurred in the tubing department." Middleton's
77. Humboldt Comm. Schs. v. Fleming, 603 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1999)
(quoting Dulavey when awarding compensation for suicide resulting from work-
related stress, anxiety, and depression); cf. Blanchard v. Belle Plaine/Vinton Mo-
tor Supply Co., 596 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (denying compensation
for suicide on grounds decedent's depression was "endogenous [in that it came]
from within [the] individual and not from the environment."); see also Dunlavey v.
Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Iowa 1995) (applying same causa-
tion standard of Humboldt to award compensation for job-related stress not culmi-
nating in suicide).
78. Findley v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 660 P.2d 874, 878 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(stating suicide should be compensated as any other inability to work); Chu v.
W.C.A.B., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 221, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating both physical and
mental injuries sustained as a result of job stress are compensable); Hammons v.
City of Highland Park Police Dep't., 364 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Mich. 1984) (holding
"[i] f the work results in mental injury and the mental injury results in suicide, the
suicide is compensable."); Miller v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 631, 654
N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding "if a work-related injury causes a
pattern of mental deterioration, which in turn causes suicide, death benefits may
be awarded...."); Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568 A.2d 159, 166 (Pa. 1990) (denying
compensation for suicide that resulted from decedent's subjective reaction to
normal working conditions); Globe Sec. Syst. Co. v. W.C.A.B., 544 A.2d 953, 957
(Pa. 1988) (awarding compensation for security guard's suicide that occurred im-
mediately after guard shot robbery suspect); Cohn ex rel. Shindell v. Apogee, Inc.,
593 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
79. Middleton v. N.W. Airlines, 600 N.W.2d 707, 707 (1999).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 707-08 (citing the following departmental changes as causes for
Middleton's stress: a change to the procedure used to inspect tubing prior to its
use on aircraft; Middleton's rank as senior employee in the department after a co-
worker's retirement; a large backlog of work orders as a result of a one-time retro-
fit of DC-9 aircraft.)
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mental suffering was apparent to his family and friends, and he at-
tributed his distress to his work situation. 8'
Middleton consulted his family physician and was referred to a
psychologist who diagnosed situational depression."' Subsequently,
Middleton relayed his suicidal thoughts to both his wife and his
family physician, and the latter placed him on an indefinite medi-
cal leave of absence from his employment.84 Despite these efforts
and treatment with anti-anxiety and anti-depressive medications,
Middleton committed suicide inJune 1994.85
Middleton's widow filed a claim for workers' compensation
86death benefits. The claim was denied for lack of legal causation as
the evidence failed to show Middleton experienced stress beyond
81the ordinary work place stress to which all employees are exposed .
The WCCA subsequently affirmed, citing Lockwood as controlling
the non-compensability of mental/mental injuries.
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
In finding Middleton's suicide potentially compensable, the
majority premised its holding on three prongs: its assertion that
suicide is an anomaly and falls outside of Minnesota's precedent of
not compensating mental/mental 9 injuries;9' its use of Meils rather
than Lockwood as precedent; and its analysis of the current and for-
912mer legislative language.
1. Suicide As An Anomaly
In the first prong, the court did not overrule prior holdings
that denied compensation for mental/mental injuries, but instead
82. Id. at 708.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 708.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Infra note 90 and accompanying text.
89. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 708-09.
90. LARSON & LARsON, supra note 16 (defining a mental/mental injury as one
in which a mental injury is produced by mental stimulus).
91. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 709.
92. Id. at 710.
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distinguished mental/mental injuries that culminate in suicide.
"[S] tress-induced suicide cannot simply be classified a mental in-
jury produced by mental stimulus, as death is not merely a state of
mind."93 Without expressly doing so, the majority placed Middle-
ton's suicide into the mental/physical injury category94 by reason-
ing that "death by suicide [is] analogous to other subsequent physi-
cal injuries. ''95 The court buttressed this reasoning by linking its
holding to those of Aker and Egeland,96 cases in which the plaintiff's
injuries did not result in suicide. Work-related stressors triggered
"subsequent physical injuries" in Aker and in Egelana"s in the forms
of a heart attack and an ulcer respectively.
2. Meils As Controlling Precedent
As to the second prong, the court's choice of Meils rather than
Lockwood as controlling precedent had a dramatic impact on the
outcome. The employee in Meils suffered an on-the-job back injury
that precipitated his deoression and resulted in suicide nine years
after the initial injury. The employee in Lockwood suffered job-
related stress that resulted in manic depression but did not culmi-
nate in suicide.'00 The court awarded compensation in Meils'0 but
declined to do so in Lockwood.10 2 The employee in Middleton suf-
fered employment stress that resulted in depression and ultimately
his suicide.'0
93. Id. at 709.
94. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 16 (describing the first of three types of
mental injury claims).
95. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 710.
96. Id.at710-11.
97. Aker v. State of Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 282 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn.
1979) (awarding compensation for employee's fatal heart attack induced by job
duty of removing badly decomposed bodies of campers).
98. Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597, 605 (Minn. 1984)
(awarding compensation for ulcer caused by work-related stress but denying com-
pensation for depression caused by work-related stress reasoning compensation
for depression barred by Lockwood). But see Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 711 (misrep-
resenting the holding of Egeland: "police officer's ulcer aggravated by chronic de-
pression caused by work-related emotional stress held compensable").
99. Meils v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 710 (Minn. 1984).
100. Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 924-25.(Minn.
1981).
101. Meils, 355 N.W.2d at 715.
102. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 927.
103. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 708.
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By choosing to align itself with Meils and not Lockwood, the
court emphasized its requirement of some form of physical injury
for compensability.104 More importantly, it negated the require-
ment of a precipitating physical injury by asserting that the precipi-
105tating physical injury in Meils was not dispositive. The court rea-
soned that the precipitating physical injury in Meils did not
distinguish that case from Middleton because causation of a "subse-
quent injury" was the central issue in Meils. 1 6 In the court's analy-
sis, Middleton's subsequent injury was his suicide0 7 and therefore
Meils was controlling.
While there are both factual similarities and dissimilarities
amongst Meils, Lockwood and Middleton, the court's selection of Meils
as controlling allowed the court to find in Middleton's favor.'0 s
3. Legislative Language
With the third prong of its analysis, the court reviewed the
statutory amendments to date 1°9 and found suicide to be com-
pensable due to the "absence of legislative directive to the con-
trary.' ' " Finding no legislative roadblocks as it had in Schwartz"'
and Lockwood,"' the court was free to find in Middleton's favor.
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justices Anderson, Page, and Stringer disagreed with the ma-
jority opinion.1 3 The Justices noted that the compensation judge
104. Id. at 710.
105. Id.
106. Id. "In Meils, a compensable physical injury precipitated the mental de-
rangement, but that fact was not central to disposition of the primary issue: the
causal test for compensability of a subsequent injury." Id.
107. Id. at 709.
108. Id.at710-11.
109. Supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
110. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 710. But cf. Jaakola v. Olympic Steel, Inc., 56
W.C.D. 238, 240 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1996), 560 N.W.2d 92, 92 (Minn.
1997) (unpublished opinion) (involving an employee who experienced mental
stress after witnessing, as well as attempting to revive, a co-worker and friend
crushed to death in a work accident); Lockwood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312
N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1981) (citing no legislative intent to compensate mental
injuries).
111. Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 361, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1973).
112. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 927.
113. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 711-13.
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specifically found Middleton's stress did not meet the Egeland 
1 4
threshold of stress. 115 Thus, the majority improperly addressed the
issue of legal causation without first overturning the factual find-
ings of the compensation judge,16 and it could not do so based
upon the "clearly erroneous" standard."'
Justice Stringer wrote separately and further dissented on
grounds Minnesota precedent is inapposite to the majority's hold-
ing.118  Moreover, Justice Stringer argued the 1973 statutory
amendment that deleted the exclusion of suicide did not reflect
legislative intent to compensate for suicides.11 9 Finally, Justice
Stringer asserted the legislature did not have intent contrary to theS 121
holding of Lockwood120 since it had not made such intent known.
VI. ANALYSIS OF MIDDLETON'S HOLDING
The court's holding, in determining that such mental-mental
injuries as Middleton's suicide may be compensable, was proper
because it reflected public policy rationales of workers' compensa-
tion insurance, the realities of the modern workplace and modern
employees, and the disabling effects of mental injuries.
A. Public Policy
The holding conforms with public policy rationales that favor
employees' rights to workers' compensation benefits. Such policy
114. Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1984) (hold-
ing stress compensable only when it is "beyond the ordinary day-to-day stress to
which all employees are exposed").
115. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 711.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 711-712 (quoting Hengemuhle v. Long PrairieJaycees, 358 N.W.2d
54, 59 (Minn. 1984) "The findings of the judge are to be affirmed 'if, in the con-
text of the record as a whole [the findings] are supported by evidence that a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate").
118. Id. at 712-13 (asserting Lockwood has been effectively overturned by Middle-
ton since the facts of Lockwood-a school superintendent experienced debilitating
work-related stress but did not commit suicide-are directly on point to those of
Middleton).
119. Id. at 713 ("[W]e cannot read into this amendment a legislative intent
that a suicide caused by a noncompensable mental injury should be treated any
differently than any less drastic self-induced injury...").
120. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926-27 (holding manic depressive disorder
brought on by job stress to be noncompensable absent clear legislative intent to
compensate mental disabilities without physical trauma).
121. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 713.
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views require employers to take employees as they are,'12 and hold
employers strictly liable for employees' work-related injuries.13 At
the same time, the holding may test countervailing policies that
question the legitimacy and treatability of mental injuries; and rec-
ognize the economic impact of compensating such injuries.
1. Public Policy Favoring Employees
Minnesota's workers' compensation legislation is grounded in
fundamental principles of providing for employees injured on the
job regardless of the manner in which the employee sustains the in-
jury. 12 These principles are especially important when considered
in light of the fact that an injured employee surrenders his or her
common-law right to sue an employer in exchange for guaranteed
115redress through workers' compensation insurance. The statute
reflects the public's general perception that an employer bears
some responsibility for injuries incurred while the employee was
operating on the employer's behalf. 26 Middleton recognized that
belief and advanced it to include mental injuries, as well as physical
injuries, that arise out of employment.
Further, Middleton finally gave credence to an issue the court
recognized as early as Lockwood, "Unquestionably, disablement re-
sulting from a mental illness caused by mental stimulus is as real as
122. Egeland, 344 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting Walker v. Minnesota Steel Co., 167
Minn. 475, 476, 209 N.W. 635, 635 (1926)):
The Compensation Act was designed for the protection of all laborers
coming within its purview. That is, it does not apply to those only who are
strong in body. Neither is it limited to those only who are normal. Those
who are below normal, have a weakness, or carry perchance a disease, are
also within its protection. Compensation is not dependent upon any im-
plied assumption of perfect health. It does not exclude the weak or
physically unfortunate.
Id.
123. D.W. Hutt Consultants, Inc. v. Constr. Maint. Sys., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 62, 65
(Minn. 1995) ("The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide se-
curity for individuals in the work force and to shift economic loss to industry and
the public by holding employers strictly liable for work-related injuries
sustained by their employees.").
124. MINN. STAT. § 176.021 (1)(2000) ("Every employer is liable for compensa-
tion according to the provisions of this chapter and is liable to pay compensation
in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the
course of employment without regard to the question of negligence").
125. Cook, supra note 7, at 906.
126. Patricia Pattison & Philip E. Varca, Workers' Compensation For Mental Stress
Claims In Wyoming, 29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 145, 149 (1994).
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any other kind of disablement."127 The court's opinion is reflected
in data that shows mental illness can be extremely debilitating.
1 28
While the court recognized the reality of mental/mental dis-
abilities, the countervailing policies are those related to the legiti-
macy of mental illness itself, the productivity of employees with
mental injuries and the resulting cost to employers when these in-
juries occur.
2. Legitimacy/Treatability Of Mental Illness
There is still present in society today an inherent skepticism
regarding mental illness, despite data that support the veracity of•. 129
mental diseases. The reality is that mental illness affects one in
five Americans. 13  Even as, or perhaps because, mental occupa-
tional injuries are becoming more pervasive,13 | there is a reluctance
to recognize such injuries as genuine injuries with bona fide conse-132
quences. One need look no further than Minnesota's courts to
127. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926.
128. White House Fact Sheet on Myths and Facts About Mental Illness, U.S. NEWS-
wiRE, June 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 4636605.
129. Id.
Research in the last decade proves that mental illnesses are diagnosable
disorders of the brain.. .Depression is a diagnosable, treatable illness that
affects 19 million adult Americans each year. It is a disorder of the brain
that is characterized by serious and persistent symptoms such as changes
in sleep, appetite, and energy; cognitive losses such as slowed thinking;
and clearly discernible feelings like irritability, hopelessness, and guilt.
The severity and duration of depression symptoms are clearly distin-
guishable from sadness and mood swings that are part of life. When un-
treated, depression can have serious consequences. Depression is the
cause of over two-thirds of the 30,000 American suicides each year, and
according to the World Health Organization, it is the leading cause of
disability in the United States.
Id.
130. Id.
131. White House Fact Sheet on Myths and Facts About Mental Illness, U.S. NEWS-
WIRE, June 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 4636605; see also Berry, infra note 139, at
324 and accompanying text.
132. Cook, supra note 7, at 898.
The fact that many mental-mental decisions have questioned
whether mental disabilities 'arise out of employment reflects
policy concerns over the economic repercussions of allowing
such claims and an inherent distrust of psychiatric disability
rather than any real belief that employment does not play a
causal role in precipitating such disabilities.
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find evidence of this skepticism. Lockwood's mental injuries were
not compensated in 1981 but Middleton's may be now.
Alternatively, there is the belief that mental illnesses cannot be
treated T3 and an employee diagnosed with a mental illness cannot
be productive in the workplace, again despite data to the con-
135trary.
3. Economic Impact Of Mental/Mental Claims
Another countervailing policy, and perhaps one more often
held by employers and insurance companies, is the economic im-
pact of compensating mental/mental injuries. When claims in-
crease, and they will if mental/mental injuries are now com-
pensable, workers' compensation premiums and other ancillary
costs will necessarily increase. 1 6 Even if a workers' compensation
claim is never filed, mental/mental injuries have an economic im-
pact on the employer through lost productivity when a distressed
employee develops attendance or behavioral problems.
137
Competing public policies necessitate balancing differing in-
terests. While the Middleton opinion did not indicate whether the
court considered the variable interests outlined above, the court's
holding came down squarely on the side of policies favoring em-
ployees and acknowledging the realities of mental illness. Whether
the legislature will act in response remains to be seen.
133. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 927; Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 711.
134. White House Fact Sheet on Myths and Facts About Mental Illness, U.S. NEWS-
WIRE, June 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 4636605. "Research shows that eighty
percent of people treated for severe depression and 70 percent of people treated
for schizophrenia show positive responses to treatment." Id.
135. Id.
A 1995 study of the Employment Intervention Demonstration Program
run by the Center for Mental Health Services assessed the effectiveness of
employment strategies to assist individuals with severe mental illness get
and keep employment. It found that 55 percent of individuals receiving
such employment support services were working after two years. Clearly,
people with severe and persistent mental illnesses want to be employed
and productive, and given appropriate treatment and support, they can
be.
Id.
136. Safety & Health: Work-Related Fatalities, Injuries Cost Nation $121 Bil-
lion, Council Says, Daily Labor Report, (155 DLR A-9 BNA), Aug. 12, 1997.
137. Kathy L. Woodward, Healthy Minds, Healthy Bodies, BUSINESS FIRST OF CO-
LUMBUS, Mar. 31, 2000 at BUSFSTCOL 14A.
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B. Workplace Realities
The Middleton holding recognized the changing reality of the
modern workplace in which employees are experiencing greater
stress with less control over those stressors. 138 The result is increas-
ing mental injuries.
139
While psychological studies have recognized long recognized140-
the realities of mental/mental work-related injuries, it is not nec-
essarily surprising that Minnesota courts did not recognized them
as compensable until Middleton. "Each advance in workers' com-
pensation law which recognizes and compensates a cause or source
of employee disability has been met with judicial or statutory resis-
tance and corresponding attempts to limit the extent to which
workers' compensation would be expanded. 1 In overcoming itsF42
resistance that began with Lockwood, the court has, nearly twenty
years later, given substance to what it intuitively knew in 1981.
"Undoubtedly, sound medical opinion can often relate mental in-
jury to employment stresses, whether unusual or minor daily
stresses.
C. Mental/Mental Injuries Are Disabling And Should Be Compensable
The holding removed the artificial requirement of an associ-
ated physical injury for a mental injury to be compensable. This ar-
138. Workplace Stress Claims Are Seen As Growing Trend Of Concern To Employers,
242 DLR C-I(BNA), December 17, 1986 (Positing that the increase in stress-
related claims is due to clerical and white collar jobs that are routine and me-
chanical, and citing a study by Robert Karasek, an associate professor in the De-
partment of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Southern
California in Los Angeles, which found that some of the most stressful jobs are
those high in psychological demand but low in control over working conditions).
139. Berry, supra note 6, at 323 (stating "The American Psychological Associa-
tion predicts that stress-related injuries will be the most pervasive occupational
disease of the 21st century. Mental disorders already rank among the top ten work-
related injuries and illnesses in the nation."); see also Workplace Stress Claims Are Seen
As Growing Trend Of Concern To Employers, 242 DLR C-1, BNA, December 17, 1986
(citing studies which show insurance claims for mental stress injuries more than
doubled between 1980 and 1982 while claims for other disabling work injuries de-
creased; mental stress claims accounted for 11 percent of all occupational disease
claims during the same period.).
140. Supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
141. Cook, supra note 7, at 906.
142. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 926 (declining to compensate job-related depres-
sion where no physical injury was present).
143. Id. at 927.
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tificiality is most clearly seen by comparing the holdings of Lockwood
with Mitchell v. White Castle Systems, Inc. and Ziebarth v. Hubbard
Milling.45 In Lockwood, the court refused to compensate a debilitat-
ing mental illness found to be caused by work-related stress. 46 The
court reasoned compensation was barred by a lack of clear legisla-• 147
tive intent. Conversely, in Mitchell and Ziebarth, the courts
awarded compensation for mental illnesses precipitated by a148 1 . 149 150
slapped face and a bruised hip 1, respectively. The Mitchell
court reasoned compensation was due as the employee's depres-
sion was the proximate result of her face being slapped by a cus-
tomer.15 ' Nine years later, the Ziebarth court held the precipitating
physical injury "need not be serious" to award compensation.
Middleton corrected the strained reasoning that provided redress
for mental illnesses triggered by trivial physical injuries but disre-
garded incapacitating mental-mental injuries.
Despite its proper holding, Middleton erred in purporting to
leave Lockwood untouched.15  The factual similarities of Lockwood• • • 154
and Middleton are striking and, asJustice Stringer's dissent notes,
Middleton effectively overruled Lockwood.15 The court should have
stated unequivocally that Lockwood was overruled.
144. 290 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. 1980).
145. 1989 WL 226720, at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1989).
146. Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 925 (stating "the compensation judge concluded
that Lockwood's psychological problems arose out of and in the course of his em-
ployment... [t] he Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed").
147. Id. at 926. The court stated "[w]e are unwilling.. .to construe our statute
as affording workers' compensation coverage for mental disability caused by work-
related stress without physical trauma because we are unable to determine that the
legislature ever intended to provide such coverage." Id.
148. Mitchell, 290 N.W.2d at 753.
149. Ziebarth, 1989 WL 226720 at *1.
150. But cf Dunn v. U.S. West Communications, 52 W.C.D. 682, 686 (Minn.
Work. Comp. Ct. App. 1995) (declining to compensate post-traumatic stress disor-
der caused by robbery in which plaintiff sustained a minor wrist injury on grounds
injury was an "insufficient physical trauma").
151. Mitchell, 290 N.W.2d at 753.
152. Ziebarth, 1989 WL 226720 at *3.
153. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 713 (noting "the majority's holding that now
awards coverage clearly overrules Lockwood and takes a step we were unwilling to
take in Lockwood...").
154. Id. at 707; see also Lockwood, 312 N.W.2d at 925. In Middleton and Lockwood,
both employees incurred severe mental illness as a result of their employment;
Middleton committed suicide while Lockwood did not.
155. Middleton, 600 N.W.2d at 713.
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VII. CONCLUSION
With Middleton v. N. W. Airlines, Minnesota held for the first
time that suicide caused solely by work-related stress is a com-
pensable workers' compensation injury. The holding marks a sig-
nificant departure from previous rulings in which the court de-
clined to compensate mental-mental injuries.
The court's decision was proper in that it recognized public
policy interests that hold employers strictly liable for employment
injuries; that appreciate the disabling effects of mental illness; and
that acknowledge the nature of the stressors present in the mod-
ern-day workplace. The decision was also proper in advancing
Minnesota to the bar set by other states that compensate suicide
caused by work-related mental injuries.
23
Boehmke: Employment Law—Allowing Compensability of Suicide under Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 37
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/37
